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PUBLIC UTILITIES - METHODS OF VALUATION - PRUDENT INVESTMENT AS THE SoLE METHOD - The state board of railroad commissioners, in
reducing the rates of the plaintiff utility, adopted a valuation based on the
"'prudent investment" theory, claiming that under a statute of the state 1
-such method of valuation had to be used. Plaintiff urged that valuation should

1

N. D. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1925), § 4609c37.
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have been measured by reproduction cost minus depreciation. Held, valuation
by the commission was improper, since the statute did not authorize the use of the
"prudent investment" theory as the sole standard. Northern States Power Co.
v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, (N. D. 1941) 298 N. W. 423.
The "fair value" theory of valuing the property of public utilities incident
to determining rates as first expounded by the Supreme Court in the case of
Smyth v. Ames 2 has led to great confusion and expense because of its indefiniteness and because of the difficulties attending the determination of reproduction
and original costs minus depreciation. 3 Consequently the theory has been soundly
criticized by text-writers, economists, and legislative commissions in recent
years.4 Many authorities advocate the "prudent investment" theory as the
solution to this problem, 5 and a few state commissions have employed this
method for valuation purposes. 6 In the principal case, although the statute pro2
169 U.S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898). In this case the Supreme Court decided
that a public utility must be allowed to charge rates which would yield a fair return
on the "fair value" of the property used in the business to satisfy the due process
clause of the Constitution. Several factors were to be considered as evidence of "fair
value": original cost, market value and amount of bonds and stock, cost of reproducing
the property, cost of permanent improvements, profits which would be realized under
various rates prescribed by the statute, and operating expenses. Though no indication
was made as to the relative weight to be given the different items, original cost and
reproduction cost soon were given major consideration.
3
See Booth, "Prudent Investment, Fair Value and Public Utility Regulation,"
l NAT. LAwY. GUILD Q. 229 at 238-250 (1938), for an excellent treatment of the
inherent difficulties involved in computing fair value by the basis set out in Smyth v.
Ames and the necessarily unrealistic valuation that results.
4
Kauper, ''Wanted: A New Definition of the Rate Base," 37 MicH. L. REv.
1209 (1939); Booth, "Prudent Investment, Fair Value and Public Utility Regulation,"
1 NAT. LAwY. GUILD Q. 229 (1938}; NEw YoRK COMMISSION ON REVISION OF
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS LAw, MINORITY REPORT (1930) (N. Y. Leg. Doc.
75); 2 BoNBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 1078-II65 (1937); concurring
opinion of Justice Brandeis in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Commission of Missouri, 262 U. S. 276, 43 S. Ct. 544 (1923); concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307
U.S. 104, 59 S. Ct. 715 (1939). For extensive list of law reviews, texts and judicial
opinions attacking the fair value rule, see Kauper, "Wanted: A New Definition of
the Rate Base," 37 MICH. L. REV. 1209, note 2 (1939).
5
Goddard, "Public Utility Valuation," 15 MICH. L. REV. 205 at 223 et seq.
(1917); Booth, "Prudent Investment, Fair Value and Public Utility Regulation," l
NAT. LAWY. GUILD Q. 229 at 250-254 (1938}; Whitten, "Fair Value for Rate
Purposes," 27 HARV. L. REV. 419 (1914).
6 In Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Milwaukee, P. U. R. 1918E I at 23
(1918), the Wisconsin Railroad Commission said: "Fair value may be expressed as the
amount which has been prudently and economically invested in the property. This
would seem to represent fair dealing, on the one side, as to the public, and a fair
measure of the sacrifice of those who have inve~ted their money in the utility." The
commission of Massachusetts has also been unwilling to follow the fair value doctrine
and has used the prudent investment theory. Bay State Rate Case, (Mass. Pub. Serv.
Comm.) P. U. R. 1916F 221.
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vides that the prudent investment theory shall be used 7 as the basis of valuation,
the court interpreted the statute to mean that all the considerations set forth in
Smyth v. Ames were to be considered also. 8 The original draft of the relevant
section of the statute in the principal case made no provision for the use of the
prudent investment theory, this provision being added by a subsequent amendment. If the court's reasoning in the principal case is to be followed, such
amendment is treated merely "as a matter of pastime, or to increase the words
of the statute." 9 Many of the items enumerated in the statute for consideration
in determining value would also be considered if reproduction cost were the
basis, but these items are included in the statutory method for use only in case
the actual figures of investment necessary for the prudent investment theory are
lost or misplaced. The inclusion of these alternative items would appear to be
no basis for a finding that reconstruction cost is to be given major emphasis.10
Apprehension that the statute fails to meet the constitutional requirements laid
down in Smyth v. Ames is not a basis for rewriting the statute to conform to
such requirements,11 especially in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly refused to interfere with rates based on valuation reached by the
7 N. D. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1925), § 4609c37(g): "The value of the property
of a public utility company, as determined by the commissioners, shall be such sum
as represents, as nearly as can be ascertained, the money honestly and prudently invested in the property." The original interpretation of the Board of Railroad Commissioners as to this section that value was to be determined on the basis of prudent
investment alone was later changed, and in Re Western Electric Co., P. U. R. 1923C
820 at 830, prudent investment was held to be only one of the factors to be considered. But the board returned to i_ts original interpretation in Re Otter Tail Power
Co., 33 P. U. R. (N. S.) 301 (1940). The board in the principal case used the term
"historical cost" as being synonymous with "prudent investment."
8 Principal case, 298 N. W. 423 at 430.
9 Christianson, J., dissenting in the principal case, 298 N. W. 423 at 437. The
dissent also presents an illuminating discussion regarding the use of the prudent investment theory.
10 The Wisconsin Railroad Commission in Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co.
v. Milwaukee, P. U. R. 1918E I at 24 (1918), said that considerations, much the
same as those outlined in the statute under consideration in the principal case, were
pertinent and material to· a determination of the "investment reasonably and prudently
made."
The elements to be considered in reaching the amount of money prudently
invested are included in N. D. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1925), § 4609c37 (a)-(f).
11 Rogers-Ruger Co. ,,. Murray, II5 Wis. 267, 91 N. W. 657 (1902); I
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION, 2d ed. (Lewis), 136 (1904). However,
there is some indication that this is what the court did in the principal case since
the majority, in discussing construction of the statute, said that if the statute is of
doubtful meaning it should be interpreted to conform to constitutional requirements
and that the rule in Smyth v. Ames, although subjected to severe criticism, is, at
least for the time being, the well-established standard. However, the wording of the
statute would seeni to be unambiguous, so that it is difficult to follow the reasoning of
the majority on this point. But see Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U. S.
104, 59 S. Ct. 715 (1939), where the Supreme Court seems to uphold a New Jersey
statute by such judicial legislation, and see Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion.
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"prudent investment" method.12 The decision in the principal case is to be
regretted, since it imposes upon the legislature the difficult problem of reframing
the statute in such a way as to indicate clearly that the prudent investment theory
shall be the basis finally to be used by the commission in determining value for
the purpose of establishing fair rates.
lay W. Sorge

12 The attitude of the Supreme Court has been that it is not sitting as a board
for revision of methods used to determine rates but to enforce constitutional rights,
the question for the Court being whether the rates as fixed are confiscatory. See Los
Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Commission of California, 289 U.S. 287, 53 S.
Ct. 637 (1932); Clark's Ferry Bridge Co. v. Public Service Commission, 291 U. S.
227, 54 S. Ct. 427 (1934); Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 302 U. S. 388, 58 S. Ct. 334 (1938); Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co., 292 U.S. 151, 54 S. Ct. 658 (1934); and see Hale, "The New Supreme Court
Test of Confiscatory Rates," 10 J. LAND & Pun. UTIL. EcoN. 307 (1934). But see
West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 295 U.S. 662, 55 S. Ct. 894 (1935),
where the Court did reverse the :findings of a state commission on the basis of methods
used without looking at the end result, thus indicating that if the method of valuation
used is highly arbitrary, the :findings will be reversed. The method used in this case
was reproduction cost trended with the shifting purchasing power of the dollar.

